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21.- INTRODUCTION
Within the main aspects undertaken by the corporate finance, it could be highlighted the
study of the capital structure [CS] decided by the companies1. The search of an optimal CS
has been one of the main concerns of the research done so far. Even though the studies
have been based on the behaviour of big companies –because of the information gathered
from the financial markets by means of the quotation of the shares and bond issued-, it
might be thought that the study of the CS for Small and Medium Enterprices [SME`s] is
more actualised and recent because the study of the CS within this group of companies is
more limited because of, i) the difficulty to get information since these companies go to the
credit market rather than the capital market to get money to fund their projects, and ii) the
difficulty to get funds from others, because of their credit constraints.
The CS of the companies have been explained by different theories, among them, the
present article analyzes the evolution of the CS of the Spanish SME from the point of
view of the “pecking order theory”. The reason why we decided to use this theory is
because it is a reliable theory that has been empirically tested in most of the works done
in Spain about SME by means of the negative correlation between the economic return
of the SME and their leverage level. However, there are other variables such as: age,
size and sector within which the compny is running, that are key variables to study the
behaviour and financial structure of the SME. Therefore, the pecking-order-theory,
would be a useful and reliable tool to explain it.
The way of achieving the objective already mentioned is studying the impact of the
variables specified before as well as other relevant factors found in the literature
(growth opportunities, tangibles weight as a proxy to the real guarantees, the financial
charges and other macro-variables) about CS in the SME from the point of view of
general leverage level, lifetime of the total debt and proportion of bank debt. The last
subject mentioned above is a new point of view with respect to other works related with
the study of CS within the Spanish market. The reason to include this important aspect
                                                                
1It is used the term capital structure as a synonimous of financial structure, and defined as the fund
composition (equity and liabilities) that allows the financing of the company investment projects.
Sometimes (Sogorb, 2002), when it is talked about the financial structure (study of origin and resource
application) make sense a distinction between the i) capital structure (combining equity and liabilities)
and, ii) investment structure (aplication of the available funds).
3in the analysis, is groundeed on the fact that the Spanish financial system is mainly
characterised by being a bank-oriented one.
After this introduction, section 2 has to do with the different theories that explain the CS of
the companies in general, and the one of SME in particular. Then, section 3, presents  the
hypothesis to test. The section 4 presents the database and the methodology followed.
Eventually, in section 5 the main results are presented, and finally section 6 conclude with
the main findings and contributions of the paper.
2.- THEORIES EXPLAINING THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE
There are many theories that have dealt with the behaviour of the companies in relation
to their CS. Many of them are grounded on the basics of large companies. The different
theories explain the financial behaviour of the companies, taking into account that their
capital structure is the result of the different points of view to tackle different problems.
In this sense, a brief revision of each theory is presented as well as an analysis of its
application to the characteristics and environment of the SME.
i)"Irrelevance Theory" (Durand, 1952; Modigliani and Miller, 1958). According to this
theory, the CS of the companies is irrelevant of the market value of the company. The
authors depart from some propositions that are not strongly adjusted to reality. These
propositions will be nullified by following articles such as those of Modigliani and
Miller (1963) and Miller (1977) which assume that financial markets are not perfect,
and assume that there are asymmetric information. Moreover, they assume that neither
the companies nor the investors might get into debt at a riskless interest rate, and, that it
cannot be forgotten the effect of taxes over the debt, which actually represents a save.
Then, appear new explanatory factors about the leverage level, and as a consequence,
the CS is not irrelevant any more.
Given this original focus, a new approach is being considered taking into account the
effects of tax savings on both, the companies and the investors. The following theory
deals with it.
ii) “Static Equilibrium Theory or Trade off"  (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Stiglitz,
1969; Baron, 1974; Fama, 1978, inter alia). Within the positive and negative effects
4which come from a more debt, it is considered the effect that taxes have on the rents.
Thus, given the save in taxes as a consequence of a more debt, Modigliani and Miller
(1963) shows the possitive effect of debt. Then, given this reasoning, there appear a new
research area that analises the negative effect of debt (bankruptcy costs). These costs
could be offset the positive effects of the tax save coming from a more level of debt.
The main results of this research were: i) the uncertainty about the tax save (DeAngelo
and Mansulis, 1980); ii) The individual taxes as well as the rent taxes (Miller, 1977);
and, iii) the existence of bankruptcy costs (Kraus and Litzemberger, 1973; Scott, 1976;
Kim, 1978; Brennan and Schwartz, 1978).
After revising these theories, based on market imperfection, a new research approach
has being born that deals with new issues that may affect the CS. We are talking about
the agency problem, among which we may highlight:
iii)"Agency Theory " (Fama and Miller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Barnea, Haugen
and Senbet, 1981; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; inter alia). This theory is grounded on the
existence of asymmetric information (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger y Udell, 1995 and
1998; Norton 1991, and Hellman and Stiglitz, 2000, inter alia) among the different
agents. The theory analyses the CS of the company taking into account the agency costs,
which are the costs of having a clash of interest between the different agents in the
company, such as, i) The associated costs of capital (owner-manager), and ii) associated
costs of debt (owner-creditor)2 3 4. Thus, the equity and the liabilities are chosen in such a
way that minimize the agency costs.
Other approach further these theories is based on the effects that asymmetric information
may have over the CS. It could be highlighted:
 iv)“Preference Order Theory” or "pecking order theory" (Donaldson, 1961; Myers,
1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984): The managerial risk aversion against the shareholders
also affects their financial policy.
Following this theory, the managerial shows the following preference order to fund their
projects: a) The managerial usually prefer equity, b) then, uses liability resources when
                                                                
2 Scholtens (1999) studied the mechanisms of control that diminish the information asymmetry in order
to confront efficient projects, distinguishes between: ownership, collateral and covenants, relationships
and reputation.
3 The works of Easterbrook (1984) related to the decision on borrowing as a mechanism to facilitate the
supervision of the financial markets; and Jensen (1986) related to the decision on borrowing as a
mechanism to reduce the funds of free availability.
4 An extension to financial theory of the agency is the so called (stakeholder theory). This new approach,
considers other clash of interest who belong to the company such as the workers, the customers and
providers (Fama, 1980; Titman, 1984; Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Willianson, 1988).
5there exists profitable investment opportunities, and the internal financing are not
enough. Under this second approach, the managerial would prefer the debt rather than
issue new shares, because it is important to bear in mind, that those projects which are
not so profitable provide negative signals to the market. In the case of SME´s, the
reason grounds on the fact that, the managerial (in most of the cases, the owners)
usually does not want to lose the control of the company (Hamilton and Fox, 1998). In
this type of companies, the preference order becomes even more important given the
high costs of debt (Pettit and Singer, 1985), which according to Myers (1984), is the
main consequence of the asymmetric information within the credit market (Michaelas,
Chillenden and Poutziouris 1999). In fact, these companies may decide not to undertake
good investment projects, if besides of the financial costs there exists a cost from the
lose of control. Nevertheless, following Hall, Hutchinson and Michaelas (2000), these
costs depend on the particular sector where the company is running, the leverage and
the CS, etc.
v) “Signalling Theory” (Ross, 1977; Leland and Pyle, 1977; Heinkel, 1987 and
Zingales, 2000, inter alia): This theory makes assumptions about the market value of
the shares given the changes in the CS. The key point of this idea grounds on the fact
that the market acts as a supervisor and a controller of the managerial funtion,
evaluating the financial decision making as a signal of future cash flows and the
company solvency.
In general, the agents who are more informed within the market know that their shares
are giving signals, hence, sometimes, these signals may be manipulated to give
favorable information. Therefore, it may be said, that the CS is a signal that is captured
for the market, in such a way that investors realise the financial decision-making
undertaken by the company.
Finally, a recient research developes a theory which consideres the competence within
the good markets in which SME runs.
vi) “Corporate Strategy Theory” (Brander and Lewis, 1986; Barton and Gordon, 1988;
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; Lowe, Naughton and
Taylor, 1994; Robson, Gallagher and Daly, 1994; Jordan, Lowe and Taylor, 1998; and
Kochhar and Hitt, 1998). In the case of SME, can be highlighted Robson, Gallagher and
Daly (1994), and Jordan, Lowe and Taylor (1998). This theory, studies the effect that
corporate strategies over the financing decision-making, basically over the CS. These
6effects may be: i) strategies related with the commodity market, if there exists
competence and, ii) strategies related to the commodity as well as the production factor.
These theories have explained basically the CS of big size companies, that is to say, of
those companies with a market value such as gives information to the investors. These
theories according to Barclay and Smith (1999) are complementary rather than
independent. After the work of Harris and Raviv (1991), there have been different articles
that besides of empirical test, also study the effects of different type of resources given
different maturities, etc. (Michaelas, et al., 1999, inter alia).
However, in the specific case of SME, the CS has been discussed by Keasey and Watson
(1987); Storey, Watson and Wynarczyk (1988); Ang (1991 and 1992); Reid (1993) and
Storey (1994); Robson, et al., (1994) and Jordan, et al., (1998); inter alia. In Spain,
Maroto (1996); Boedo and Calvo (1997); López and Aybar (2000); inter alia, have
published outstanding studies in this field.
Since the environment in which SME runs is mainly characterised by: i) low desclosure of
financial information, ii) lach of a valuation and iii) low possibility of being in the capital
markets. We understood that those theories related with asymmetric information are the
most accurate to explain the CS of SMEs. However, the no existence of a market
gathering signals and information about the financial behaviour of the companies makes
the test of the signaling theory apllied to the SME  more difficult
SMEs run in an environment characterised by scarse information given to external
agents by means of their financial statements, because the majority of them are not
oblied to present detailed financial statements but abbreviated with less information.
Furthermore, the existence of risk rating rankings provides information about the
capacity of SME to face their debts, as well as information about the risk of the debt
itself. On the other hand, since SMEs do not have the capacity to go to the capital
markets the information is even less. Because of it, there exists asymmetric information
between the outsiders and the insiders at the SME. In sum, and as a consequence of the
stated before, it is expected that the theories about the capital structure that would be
better off to explain the bahaviour of SMEs and their financing structure will be those
7based on asymmetric information such as the signalling theory and the pecking-order-
theory.
Concerning the signalling theory, it is assumed that companies choose the level of debt
such that makes the external agents identifying the quality of the company (Cardone and
Cazorla, 2001). However, for SMEs it is difficult to access the external markets to give
signals about its quality, because of that the validity of this theory decreases. Therefore,
it seems that the pecking-order-theory.is the most accurate theory since it is able to
adjust and explain the financial behaviour of the SMEs.
Previous works have empirically tested the pecking-order-theory, by means of the
negative relationship between the level of debt and the return on assets of the
companies. The present work tests, by means of this theory, the financial behaviour of
the companies taking into account the levarage ratio and the maturity of other
characteristics that define the SMEs. Besides the return on assets, it is also studied the
relationship between the size, the age, the proportion of tangibles and the growth
opportunities for each component of the CS, such as the leverage ratio, the duration of
the debt, the proportion of fund from banks and its duration.
As it was mentioned before, since the spanish financing system is focused on bank, then
it will be interesting to analise whether the causes of the debt are or are not relevant for
the financing of the spanish SMEs.
3.- PECKING ORDER THEORY PREDICTIONS
The pecking-order-theory.considers that the greater is the asymmetric information
between insiders and outsiders, then, greater will be the probability that the companies
get internal funds, so that, the problem of subvaluating is reduced. Furthermore, as the
asymmetries become greater, the companies will decide to go to debts that need softer
requirements. Therfore, the greater the asymmetric information, the greater the
preferemnce of self-financing and greater the difficulties to get long run funds.
8On the other hand, the greater the asymmetric information, the gerater will be the
constraint to get bank credits. Therefore, it is expected to find a smaller proportion of
bank debt.
Figure 1 reports the predicted relationships between all the CS determinants and the
level of asymmetric information. Doing so, we can construct the different hypotheses
about their effects on the SMEs`CS, from the point of view of the pecking-order theory.
Taking into account these results, we postulate that when a company gets greater
growth opportunities, the uncertainty becomes larger as well as the asymmetric
information. However, as the companies becomes more mature, and have more size, and
greater proportion of tangibles, the asymmetries becomes smaller, because it is easier
for external agents to get information from the company. When the environment
becomes more uncertaint, SMEs will be also affected and the asymmetries will be high
in this case.
Figure 1
Expected effects on the asymmetric information
Level of capital structure determinants Asymmetric information
Growth opportunities +
Size -
Tangible assets -
Age -
Macroeconomic effects (interest volatility, temporal
structure of interest rates)
+
The relationships between each factor determining the CS and the different components
of the financing of the companies leads, according to the pecking-order-theory
prediction, to the following hypotheses.
ISTRESS
· The greater the size, the smaller the asymmetric information, and it is expected
that:
H1a. The external financing becomes larger.
H1b: The long run debt becomes larger.
H1c: The proportion of bank debt becomes larger.
9· The greater the age of the company, the smaller the asymmetric information, and
it is expected that:
H2a: The external financing becomes larger.
H2b: The long run debt becomes larger.
H2c: The proportion of bank debt becomes larger.
· The greater the growth opportunities, the greater the asymmetric information,
and it is expected that:
H3a: The external financing becomes smaller.
H3b: The long run debt becomes smaller.
H3c: The proportion of bank debt becomes smaller.
· The greater the proportion of tangibles assets, the smaller the asymmetric
information, and it is expected that:
H4a: The external financing becomes larger.
H4b: The long run debt becomes larger.
H4c. The proportion of bank debt becomes larger.
· The greater the uncertainty caused by macroeconomic variables, the greater the
asymmetric information, and it is expected that:
H5a: The external financing becomes smaller.
H5b: The long run debt becomes smaller.
H5c: The proportion of bank debt becomes smaller.
H6: The greater the return, the smaller the proportion of debt and smaller the bank debt.
Taking into account all the effects mentioned before, it is studied the relationships
between the characteristics of the companies and the different components of the CS. To
do so, the next section, first, makes a descriptive study of the sample and then, estimates
several econometric models that allow us to test the hypotheses presented above.
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4.- EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1. Sample description
The Database used to test the relevance of the pecking-order theory for the CS of
Spanish SME comes from the SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos). The
database surveys the balance sheets, income statements and others complementary
financial information for 200,000 non-financial Spanish firms. Since there is no-full
information for all of them, we will work only with those that have available detailed
annual accounts. Although we can find more annual data, the period covered in this
study is 1994-1998 because of lack of information for the very first years of the sample.
Also, we consider only those SME presented in the sample taking into account the
European Comission definition (Recommendation of the Commission, April, 3th, 1996
about the definition of small and medium enterprises 96/280/CE) for SME and some
other filters that are reported in Appendix 1. The final sample is an unbalanced panel
data composed of 13,266 SME with 42,258 observations.  Table I reports the annual
distribution of these observations per year.
Table I
Annual distribution of the obervations
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total number
Of observations 6,080 8,520 9,215 9,486 8,957
In Spain, there exist more than 2,200,000 SME, therefore the databse we are working
with, represents approximately 0.6% of the whole Spanish entrepeneural market, which
let us to provide a representative idea of what is really happening. The size of the
database used for this study supposes an additional contribution of this paper to the
literature.
4.2. Variable description
In this section we describe the variables used to analyze the empirical relevance of the
pecking-order theory to explain the CS of the Spanish SME. We consider two types of
variables: i) those variables used to describe the composition of capital structure in Box
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I, and ii) those variables influencing and explaining the SME`s CS in Box II. Notice that
the variable presented in both boxes will be used for the descriptive analysis and some
for the econometric analysis.
Box I
Capital Structure Variables
Leverage ratio Amount of total liabilities respect to total level of assets.
STDR Short-term debt ratio: Costly short debt over total costly debt.
BD_CD Bank loans to costly debt ratio. It is the ratio of overall amount of bank credits to total coslty debt.
STBD_BD Short-term bank debt ratio: Short-term bank debt over total bank debt.
BD_TA Total amount of bank credits respect to total amount of assets.
STD_TA Short-term debt respect to total amount of assets.
LTD_TA Long-term debt respect to total amount of assets.
Box II
Explanatory variables
Size Considering the European Comission SME definition:
Micro: number of employees < 10
Small: 10<= number of employees <50, sales bellow 7 million € and total assect under 5 million €
Medium: 50<= number of employees <250, sales between 7 and 40 million €, total assets between
5 and 27 million €
For the econometric analysis we only consider the number of employees.
Age Mature: its age is higher than 10 years
Young:  its age is lower than 10 years
Business
Sector
We consider CNAE93 Clasificaton elaborated by INE (Spanish Statistic National Institute). The
number of groups of activities is 9.
Forjur Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is “Corporation” and 0, otherwise. (Look
at note 7 for an explanation).
Findes Financial distress. Dummy variabble that takes the value of 1 when the interest coverage ratio is
higher or equal to 2, and 0 otherwise (Padilla y Requejo,1997).
Tang Tangibility assets. Ratio of tangible assets respect to total assets.
GO Grow opportunities: it is the ratio computed by the proportion of intangible assets divided by total
assets.
ROA Return on assets as a proxy of economic performance. It is the ratio of EBIT on total assets
TSIT It is the temporal structure of interest rates.
Volat Volatility of the interest rate. It is measured as an annual mean of MIBOR 3 months.
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4.3. Descriptive Analysis
We conduct the empirical analysis in two parts. The first, this section, involves mean
tests and descriptive analysis of the SME included in the study according to their
different size, age, business sector, legal form and the financial distress situation respect
to the diferent CS ratios defined above. The second, the following section, involves an
econometric study to test the main factors explaining SME` CS.
Most of the studies about the CS have been concerned with stablishing a comparison
between the CS of big size companies and the CS of SME. This paper focuses on the
CS of SME and answers the following question. What do we know about the Spanish
SME` capital structure?. To do that, the SME sample is divided in three categories
(micro, small and medium),. Table II reports the percentage of the different types of
SME for the period considered.
Table II
Annual percentage of firms and size (considering European Comission definiton)
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Micro (%) 15 16 17 16 16
Small (%) 47 43 39 35 28
Medium (%) 38 41 44 49 56
From Table II (and also in Graph I) we can see the distribution of the SME and how the
percentage of micro business is smooth all the period but the proportion of medium type
companies is increasing all the period against the reduction in the proportion of small
type5.
                                                                
5 If we consider the definiton of size according to the number of employees, the restuls indicate the
increase in the number of medium type companies, and the stability of the micro type firms. So, both
GRAPH 1: ANNUAL DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY 
SIZE
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Medium (%)
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It is also a goal of this paper to analyze SMEs`capital structure taking into account the
different business sector where each company belongs. Following the CNAE93
classification of the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) for the business
activities we consider nine groups of activity and their relative importance in the whole
sample is reported in Table III.
Table III
Distribution of SME according to their business sector (%)
CNAE93 Activity description Relative importance (%)
1 Agriculture, foresty and mining 1.54
2 Manufacturing 38.52
3 Construction 6.24
4 Wholesale and retail trade 35.71
5 Restaurants and hotels 2.32
6 Transports and communications 5.01
7 Business services 7.78
8 Education 0.88
9 Others 2.04
As it can be seen in Table III, the main business sector where SME in the sample work
are: 2 (manufacturing), and 4 (Wholesale and retail trade). After that, Services (7) and
Construction (3) are the most important. Furthermore,  we will center in the first two
sectors to analyze the different financial behaviour of those companies according to
their industrial activity.
The company`s age is another variable used to study SME and we find a 29.29% of
Spanish SME in the sample are younger than 10 years old, and a 70.71% are older than
10 years old. This fact reflects the consolidated character of the SME in the case of
Spain and it supposes the high degree of surviving.
Although we have dropped all those observations with bankcruptcy problems (those
with negative shareholders`equity), we consider the different behaviour of SME
according to their possible financial distress. The way of doing so is constructing a new
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when the interest coverage ratio (defined as
                                                                                                                                                                                             
types of measures are consistent, although the variabitily is lower in this case.
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Gross Margin/Interest expenses) is bigger than 2, what supposes that the company
affords the interest payment, and 0 if this ratio is lower than 2 meaning the company can
start to have finacial distress problems. Considering this characteristic along the period,
Table IV reports a decreasing trend in the percentage of SME with more possibilities of
getting a financial distress for the period 1.994-1.998, but we must take into account
that they are not in a bankcruptcy situation. One of the possible explanation could be the
decrease in the interest level for the period considered (Appendix 2) what helped SME
to have a better financial health.
Table IV
Annual percentage of firms and possible problems of financial distress (high & low)
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
HIGH(%) 45 43 41 35 28
LOW(%) 55 57 59 65 72
Considering the legal form of the companies, Table V shows, how independently to the
size type of SME considered (micro, small or medium), a higher proportion of
“corporation” can be found instead of “non corporation” 6. Although the expenses that a
company has to afford to constitute a society with the legal structure as a Business
Corporation are higher, this expenditure can be compensated by a reduction in the tax
ratio up to 30%. In fact, this posibility is more affordable for bigger companies, as can
be seen in Table V.
Table V
Percentage of SME firms with differents legal structure
Micro Small Medium
Non –corporation  (%) 30 18 9
Corporation  (%) 70 82 91
Lately, and as a part of this first descriptive analysis, itr is presented the average of the
variables which define the CS of the SMEs. Graph 2, shows that the average level of the
external fonds used by the SMEs analysed is 55%. Also, it can be seen that most of the
external financing (80%) is short run fond, which once again comes to show the
constraints faced by this group of companies. Graph 2 also shows that, in average, the
60% of the external financing of SMEs has a cost, and a 40% comes from suppliers.
                                                                
6 In our case corporations are refering to Joint Stock Companies (in the case of Spanish classification we
are refering to Sociedad Anónima”), and non-corporations includes the rest of legal forms like Limited
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Finally, just the 26% of the external financing, and half of the financing with costs are
bank debt. Later, it is analysed the main variables which affects that bank debt and its
duration.
Graph 2
Once we have described the characteristics and distribution of our sample, now
we are going to study the CS respect to all these characteristics. As we told before, we
consider different levels of CS: leverage (LEV),  maturity debt (STDR), bank
indebtness (BD_CD) and maturity of bank debt (STBD_BD). The reason why we study
the behaviour respect to the bank indebtness, is because the Spanish financial system
belongs to the bank-oriented one, what justifies the importance of this financial
instrument as we tested above.
Respect to the size, Table A3.1 (Appendix 3) reports how higher companies have more
short-term debt, higher level of indebtness, more bank debt, but the level of long-term
debt respect total assets is lower for this type.
It may be said that since the medium size companies are funded with short run debt,
then, they are able to improve the agreement conditions of long run debt. These results
are similar to those obtained in other papers which use the same database (Sogorb,
2002) .
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Table A3.2 (Appendix 3) reports the mean test by maturity of the company respect to all
the CS ratios. From this first statistical approach, we can conclude that mature firms are
less indebted, use more bank debt and use less long-term debt respect to total assets. But
respect to the level of short-term debt, although there is a significant difference in
STDR, this loses its significance in the case we consider the level of short-term-debt
respect to level of assets. So we will analyse it wth more detail in the econometric
analysis.
Financial distressed associated to the different CS ratios is studied in Table A3.3
(Appendix 3). We can conclude that those companies with higher probability of
financial distress count with higher level of indebtness, more bank debt, more long and
short-term debt respect to the assets. But if we consider the short-term debt ratio it
results lower.
Table A3.4 (Appendix 3) reports the different CS ratios for all activity sectors. The
sectors with more debt are: building (3); wholesale and retail trade (4), transport and
communication (6). Those industries which use more banking debt are wholesale and
retail trade (4), manufacturing (2) and Others (9). Concerning the lifetime of the debt
with costs, we find out that those sectors which are mainly short run financed are
wholesale and retail trade (4), manufacturing (2), building (3) and Others (9).
To analyse whether the differences are statistically significant, we focus on two sectors
[manufacturing (2) and wholesale and retail trade (4)] which are the most important in
our sample where the SMEs are working (see Table 3.4 in Appendix 3). By comparing
these two sectors, it may be said that the manufacturing sector has more banking debt
than the comercial sector. The reason could be grounded on the existence of tangible
assets as guarantees to financial intermediaries. From the point of view of the short run
debt, the comercial sector has more debt than the manufacturing one. The reason could
be based on the fact that this sector uses more short run financing than long run, because
of a lower availability to use tangible assets as guarantees.
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As it can be seen in Tabla A3.5 in Appendix 3, Corporations are usually less indebted
but present more short run debt (from the point of view of the total debt and from the
point of view of the total assets).
4.4. Econometric Analysis
The empirical specification to analyze the behaviour of the CS is given by:
where ite  denotes error coefficient, which is normally distributed with cero mean and s
2
variance and .hi represents the fixed effects associated to each firm. CS represents the
different ratios that describe the capital structure for every case according to general
level of indebtness (LEV), bank indebtness (BD_CD), debt maturity (STDR) and bank
debt maturity (STBD_BD). The explanatory variables used are:  SIZE, measured by the
number of employees and a proxy of the size of the company;  AGE, as a proxy of the
age of the company; GO which measures the growth opportunities; TANG, which is the
proportion of tangible assets and a proxy of the guarantees that may be presented by the
firm as a collateral;  and ROA which measures the economic performance. We
introduce some control variables like FINDES, as a proxy of the possibilities of
financial distress DSEC, which is a dummy variable that captures the industrial effects
according to the dependent variable 7. Furthermore, two more variables have been added,
one that captures the economic cycle (TSTI) and another one, which captures the
volatility of interest rates (VOLAT).
Because of the panel structure of data, the methodology used is grounded on panel data
techniques. The advantage of using this methodology is that it will allow to manage the
unobservable firm’s heterogeneity (such as the ability of managers to get a balanced
                                                                
7 This dummy variable is measured as the difference between the mean of leverage by year and business
sector minus the mean of leverage for every year. Depending on the dependent variable that we are
explaining, DSEC takes different features. For LEV, we call this variable ENDSEC which takes the
difference between the sectors and years for the leverage level. For bank indebtness, we consider BDSEC
itiitititit
itititititit
TSIRVOLATROADSEC
TANGGOFINDESAGESIZECS
ehbbbb
bbbbba
++++++
++++++=
9876
543210
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management) as well as its possible correlation with explanatory variables (fixed
effects)8. If this is the case, the estimations will be biased, and the within group
estimator should be used. Once we apply the Hausman test9 to all the specifications, the
existence of the previous correlation is confirmed, and the within group estimation is
the only consistent one for all the models.
Apart from the problem associated to the correlation between the individual effects and
the explanatory problems, we can also find endogeneity problems related to the
economic performance and capital structure variables (leverage and maturity), in the
sense that capital structure can determine the economic performance at the same time.
Moreover, we introduce control variable for industry which can also cause endogeneity
problems. So, we test this possibility through the use of Sargan test10. Bacause the
models are estimated by fixed effects, we compare the model in first differences with
the instrumental variable model where the instrument used is the second lag of ROA
and the second lag of the industry variable. After applying Sargan test we reject the
similarity of the models in the case of leverage and maturity, but we can not reject the
null hypothesis in the case of bank debt and bank debt maturiy. As a result of that, the
final models for total debt and maturity debt are estimated by instrumental variables
(Hsiao, 1986) (columns 1 and 2) and those for bank debt and bank debt maturity are
estimated by fixed effects (columns 3 and 4) in Tabla VI. It reports also the Hausman
test, Sargan test and Goodness of fit for each model.
Table VI shows estimations of the total SME sample, and captures the effects of the
explanatory variables specified before about different levels in which the CS has been
                                                                                                                                                                                             
and for maturity debt, we use MDSEC.
8 If the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the explanatory variables, then it will be needed
conditional inference on the effects of the sample (it is known as estimation by fixed effects) If the effects
are not correlated with the explanatory variables, then the conditional inference is applied as in the
method of compound errors (random effects) [Arellano y Bover, 1990].
9 Hausman Test allows to check the resemblance of the coefficients of the intragroups estimations as well
as the estimation by random effects. The null hypothesys says that the coefficients of models are similars.
If the null hypothesys is rejected, then the intragroups estimation will be the only consistent estimation.
10 The null hypothesys of the Sargan test is that models of instrumental variables and the mean squared
ordinary are similars, therefore, there are not endogeneity problems. However, if the null hypothesys is
rejected, then, the coefficients of both models differ, which indicates the existence of endogeneity
problems.
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divided11. As it was said at the beginning, the article analysis the effect of each
explanatory variable on the different components of the CS. In contrast to other works,
it is also analysed the effects on the related components with the bank debt, since the
Spanish financial system is characterised by being oriented to the bank. To analyse
possible problems of multicolinearity, Table A3.6 (Appendix 3) reports the correlation
matrix of the variables, and it can be observed that there are not any correlation above
0,5, which proves no multicolinearity problems.
                                                                
11 The estimations done in the general case, are also done for subsamples of two sectors (manufacturing
and comercial), however, there are not significative differences among the explanatory variables used in
the general model, when they are analysed by sectors.
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Table VI
SME capital structure determinants
(1)
Leverage
(Inst. variab)
(2)
Debt
Maturity
(Inst. variab)
(3)
Bank debt
(Fixed effects)
(4)
Bank debt
maturity
(Fixed effects)
ROA -0.209*
(0.061)
-0.072
(0.639)
-0.221***
(0.000)
-0.131***
(0.000)
DSEC 0.91***
(0.000)
0.578**
(0.024)
0.252***
(0.000)
-0.0264
(0.120)
GO 0.171***
(0.001)
-0.617***
(0.000)
0.270***
(0.000)
-0.648***
(0.000)
TANG -0.073**
(0.013)
-0.334***
(0.000)
0.0879***
(0.000)
-0.443***
(0.000)
SIZE 0.092***
(0.000)
0.078***
(0.000)
0.013**
(0.013)
0.02***
(0.001)
AGE -0.003
(0.748)
0.0002
(0.985)
-0.0011
(0.715)
-0.0015
(0.698)
TSIR -0.022***
(0.000)
-0.0137**
(0.033)
0.0392***
(0.000)
-0.023***
(0.001)
VOLAT 0.0159**
(0.022)
0.0316***
(0.000)
-0.0249***
(0.002)
0.031***
(0.002)
FINDES -0.0158**
(0.017)
0.0081
(0.350)
-0.023***
(0.000)
0.0052
(0.297)
CONSTANT -0.0045
(0.632)
-0.0018
(0.877)
0.350***
(0.000)
-0.479***
(0.000)
Hausman test1 612.69
(0.00)
222.38
(0.00)
2315.16
(0.00)
373.65  (0.00)
Sargan test2 48.58 (0.00) 26.32
(0.0018)
1.11 (0.99) 14.02 (0.12)
Goodness of
fit3
42.80  (0.00) 40.52
(0.00)
97.56  (0.00) 41.46  (0.00)
In brakets p-values: ***p-value  0.01, ** p-value 0.05, p-value  0.10
T-Statistics are in brakets: ***p-value< 0.01, ** p-value<0.05, p-value< 0.10
1 X2 – Statistics and Hausman test p-value: equality test between fixed and random
effects models.
2 X2 –Statistics and Sargan endogeneity test p-value: equality test between ordinary least squares and
instrumental variable models. Because the fixed-effect model is the resulting one, we apply Sargan test to
the model with first differences.
3  Statistics and p-values of the goodness-of-fit model. In the fixed effects case corresponds to F-statistics.
5. RESULTS
Table VI captures the results from the estimations of the different variables of the CS of
the Spanish SMEs. Columns (1) and (2) refers to the composition of total debt while
columns (3) and (4) are referred to bank debt.
21
Concerning the debt and its duration, the results achieved shows that SMEs prefer to
self-finance their investiments so that they are able to generate enough internal funds.
This follows the pecking order theory (it is accepted Hypothesys 6). It si also shown
that small companies use more internal funds (it is accepted Hypothesys H1a); the
companies with greater growth opportunities get more external funds and the companies
with greater proportion of tangible assets prefer to self-finance their investment (it is
rejected hypothesys 3a and 4a, respectively)12. On the other hand, when interest rate
raises, greater are the cost faced by SMEs, therefore SMEs tend to use their own funds
(it is accepted Hypothesys 5a).
Concerning the effects on the duration, it could be noted that the return is not a
consecuence of the maturity of the debt of the SMEs. Therefore, it could be highlighted
that big companies get more funds at short run (it is rejected hypothesys 1b), the
companies with greater growth opportunities get more long run funds (it is rejected
hypothesys 3b). On the other hand, the existence of tangible assets allow a greater long
run financing, which follows the pecking-order theroy (it is accepted hypothesys 4b).
From a macroeconomic point of view, the uncertainty caused by more volatility of the
interest rate, makes that SMEs be short run financed, as the theory predict (it is accepted
hypothesys 5b).
Column (3) and (4) of Table VI capture the effects achieved for bank debt and its
duration. It is shown that more profitable companies prefer other type of fund different
to the bank debt (it is accepted hypothesys 6). However, companies with greater growth
opportunities, with greater proportion of tangible assets and greater size have more
access to bank funds (it is rejected hypothesys 3c and it is accepted hypothesys 4c and
1c, respectively). Concerning the macroeconomic effects, it is achieved that the
environments associated to greater levels of uncertainty, makes the access of SME more
difficult to the bank credit, as the pecking-order theory predicts (it is accepted
hypothesys 5c).
                                                                
12 If we define growth opportunities based on  sales increase, leverage is negatively correlated with them,
and the rest of measures are not affected by it. So, a study of these measure quality is needed, and it can
be further research.
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The results presented at column (4) related to the duration of the bank debt do not differ
from those of the duration of the global debt, except in the case of return, where it is
relevant to the duration of the bank debt. The more profitable companies prefer the self-
financing, however if they ask for bank funds, they get a greater duration than those
companies which are less profitable.
Boxes III-VI sum up the main results obtained for all the capital structure components
and the agreement or desagreement with the pecking-order theory.
Box III
Main results associated to Leverage determinants and its match with pecking-
order theory
ROA (-) SMEs prefers to self-finance their investments if they generate
retained earnings
YES
GO (+) SMEs with higher growth opporunities get more external founds NO
TANG (-) SMEs prefers self-finance their fixed investment NO
SIZE (+) Smaller SMEs use more internal resources than the larger SMEs YES
TSIR (-) Higher debt costs makes SMEs use their own resources YES
Box IV
Main results associated to debt maturity determinants and its match with pecking-
order theory
ROA does not help to determine the general debt maturity -
GO (-) SMEs wirh higher growth opportunities prefer finance them with
long-term debt
NO
TANG (-) Higher level of tangible assets helps SMEs to get more long-
term debt
YES
SIZE (+) Larger SMEs prefer to get more short-term extenal funds NO
VOLAT (+) Higher uncertainty makes SME to get more short-term debt YES
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Box V
Main results associated to bank debt determinants and its match with pecking-
order theory
ROA (-) More profitable SMEs  use less bank debt to finance their
investments
YES
GO (+) SMEs with higher growth opportunities prefer bank debt ro finance
them
NO
TANG (+) SMEs get more bank debt to finance their fixed assets YES
SIZE (+) Larger SMEs get more bank debt than the smaller SMEs YES
VOLAT (-) Higher uncertainty makes more difficult to get bank debt YES
Box VI
Main results associated to bank debt maturity determinants and its match with
pecking-order theory
ROA (-) Higher profitable SMEs prefer long-term bank debt in case they
use external funds
-
GO (-) SMEs with higher opportunities growth get more long-term bank
debt
NO
TANG (-) SME prefer to finance their fixed asset with long-term bank debt YES
SIZE (+) Larger SMEs prefer short-term bank debt NO
VOLAT (+) Higher uncertainty makes SMEs use more short-term bank
debt
YES
Looking at the p-values associated to the constants of each model, it could be proved
the significativity of them in the case of the models related to the bank components, but
not in the case of the global components of debt. This result is explained by the fact that
the bank debt and the maturity of it are determined by other factors such as those
associated to the relationships between the companies and the banks. These
relationships may affect the CS. This is an issue of future research.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this work it has been studied the variables that affect the CS of Spanish SMEs from
the point of view of the pecking-order theory. Tradicionally, the empirical test used by
this theory is based on an inverse relationship between the return of the companies and
their leverage. However, in this work, it is checked the empirical validity of the
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predictions done by the pecking-order theory in relation to other affecting variables of
the CS of the companies, such as: the size, age, the presence of the tangible assets, the
presence of growth opportunities and the macoeconmics factors.
Besides, in contrast to other works, it is analysed the influence of the described factors
over the final composition of the CS, taking into account four dimensions (total debt,
and its duration, bank debt and its duration). The reason why it has been studied
separately the bank debt is because of the importance that this debt has on the financing
of Spanish companies, given the fact that these companies are oriented to the bank.
Within a context of high asymmetries associated to SMEs, the theories grounded on
asymmetric information are especially important. However, since it is difficult to access
to the market to give signals that shows the type of the company, the pecking-order-
theory seems to be the most relevant theory to make test under this scenario.
To test the hypothesys of the study it is used a subsample from the database SABE
during the period 1994-1998. The sample is made of an incomplete panel of 13,266
companies and 42,258 observatioins. An additional contribution to the work is that
besides of the database used, it can be apply the data panel methodology taking into
account the existence of individual effects. Furthermore, the panel allow us to solve
endogeneity problems by means of the lags used in the model of instrumental variables.
The results achieved shows the importance of the pecking-order theory in the
determination of the CS of the Spanish SMEs, although it is also needed other useful
theories to explain the behaviour of the companies.
On the other hand, it could be highlighted that the bank debt is easier to get for the
SMEs with more growth opportunities. Besides, the more profitable the companies are,
the greater is the long run funds obtained.
The pecking order theory has been broadly checked in the literature by means of the
return (measured by the ROE). Therefore, since the present article considers other
variables such as the age, and the size, it is not so clear that the results fulfill this theory.
So, it is observed that capital structure theories are complementaries rather than
25
independent, then, a possible extension would be to check other theories presented at
section 2.
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APPENDIX 1
We drop all those observations with one of the following characteristics:
1. Industrial activity code not available.
2. Number of employees greater than 250
3. Amount of sales higher than 40 million €
4. Total assets greater than 27 million €
5. Abbreviate Financial Statements
6. Amount of short-term bank loans < 0
7. Amount of long-term bank loans < 0
8. Sales < 0
9. Shareholders` equity < 0
10. All those observations with negative values in supposed positive accounts.
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APPENDIX 2
Evolution of Temporal structure of Interest rates and Interest rate volatility for the
period 1.994-1.998 for Spain.
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
TSIR 1.26 1.49 0.18 -0.1 -0.17
VOLAT: 0.12 0.088 0.58 0.115 0.126
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APPENDIX 3
Table A3.1
SME´ Capital Structure according to the European Comission definition
Levarage STDR BDCD STD_TA LTD_TA
Micro 0.48 0.62 0.34 0.17 0.09
Small 0.49 0.66 0.39 0.19 0.082
Medium 0.58 0.77 0.48 0.25 0.086
p-value 1-2 * *** *** *** ***
p-value 1-3 *** *** *** *** **
p-value 2-3 *** *** *** *** **
***,**,*  diferencias significativas al 99%, 95% y 90%
Table A3.2
SME´ Capital Structure by maturity
Levarage STDR BDCD STD_TA LTD_TA
Young 0.56 0.67 0.39 0.219 0.10
Mature 0.546 0.74 0.46 0.22 0.08
p-value 1-2 *** *** *** 0.1434 ***
***,**,*  diferencias significativas al 99%, 95% y 90%
Table A3.3
SME´ Capital Structure by its financial distress situation
Levarage STDR BDCD STD_TA LTD_TA
Yes findes 0.61 0.68 0.51 0.26 0.12
No  findes 0.51 0.75 0.39 0.20 0.07
p-value 1-2 *** *** *** *** ***
***,**,*  diferencias significativas al 99%, 95% y 90%
Table A3.4
SME´ Capital Structure by industry
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Lev 0.46 0.53 0.62 0.58 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.47
STDR 0.60 0.73 0.71 0.76 0.55 0.66 0.65 0.57 0.71
Stb_ta 0.16 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.23
Ltd_ta 0.13 0.09 0.075 0.066 0.205 0.114 0.105 0.187 0.09
Bd_cd 0.42 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.39 0.37 0.29 0.38 0.26
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Table A3.4a
SME´ Capital Structure by industry
Levarage STDR BDCD STD_TA LTD_TA
Manufacture 053 0.73 0.47 0.23 0.091
Trade 0.58 0.76 0.458 0.24 0.066
p-value 1-2 *** *** *** *** ***
***,**,*  mean difference test  99%, 95% y 90%
Table A3.5
SME´ Capital Structure by its legal form
Levarage STDR BDCD STD_TA LTD_TA
Corporations 0.55 0.74 0.44 0.23 0.086
Non-corporations 0.56 0.65 0.435 0.20 0.098
p-value 1-2 ** *** 0.26 *** ***
***,**,*  mean difference test  99%, 95% y 90%
Table A3.6
Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables.
Size Age Forjur Findes TSIR Volat GO Tang Endsec Mdsec Dbsec
Size 1
Age 0.2101 1
Forjur 0.0898 0.1371 1
Findes 0.0098 -0.008 0.008 1
TSIR -0.015 -0.049 0.0358 -0.09 1
Volat -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.032 -0.265 1
GO -0.002 0.0042 0.0019 -0.009 0.0135 -0.005 1
Tang 0.2025 0.0682 -0.007 0.0024 0.0015 0.0124 0.0187 1
Endsec -0.054 -0.073 -0.032 -0.081 0.0000 0.000 -0.000 -0.189 1
Mdsec -0.033 0.0364 0.0562 0.023 0.0009 0.000 -0.009 -0.27 0.1881 1
Dbsec -0.054 0.056 -0.007 -0.086 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.3891 0.0966 1
* Bold ocefficients represents a significance level of 5% or better.
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